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I 
INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of May 27, 2000, as Israel’s nationwide doctors’ strike was 
entering its eleventh week, the Prime Minister convinced the doctors’ union to 
try mediation in order to reach an agreement. This marked the beginning of an 
unprecedented experiment with Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as a 
means of peaceful resolution of labor disputes in public healthcare. The 
experiment began with a long and highly volatile crisis mediation,1 which turned 
into strategic or preventive mediation, followed by a ten-year period under a 
voluntary no-strike arbitration regime ending in July 2010. 
This case study describes, discusses, and analyzes the no-strike arbitration in 
action, assessing its value, promise, and limitations. Drawing upon in-depth 
interviews2 with the arbitrators and the parties’ representatives and counsels, as 
well as upon the extensive litigation and transcripts of the arbitration 
proceedings and award, this case study emphasizes the process-oriented aspects 
of the arbitration. It also distills and analyzes more general insights and lessons, 
and highlights their broad, policy-oriented implications. 
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 1. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FROM 
THEORY TO POLICY AND PRACTICE 287 (1980) (explaining the distinction between crisis mediation 
and preventive or strategic mediation). 
 2. Altogether, there were eleven non-structured interviews. Interviewees were promised not to be 
cited or identified in the text. Interview notes are on file with the author. 
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II 
BACKGROUND—THE LABOR-RELATIONS TERRAIN, THE STRIKE, AND THE 
MEDIATION 
A. The Labor-Relations Landscape 
Israel has been described as a “labor state”—a state run by a labor 
movement.3 At one time, the rate of unionization was as high as eighty-five 
percent; the present rate is approximately thirty-four percent.4 One union, the 
Histadrut, represents practically every unionized worker in Israel. 
Like other professionals, doctors are highly unionized. More than ninety 
percent of all doctors employed by hospitals and clinics in Israel belong to a 
union. In contrast to almost all other white-collar employees represented by the 
Histadrut, doctors and certain other professionals5 belong to independent 
unions. Doctors are represented by a single union, the Israel Medical 
Association (IMA). 
The IMA’s constituency is highly heterogeneous. It represents many 
members with different and sometimes conflicting interests. First, the IMA is a 
federation of two unions: the Association of State Doctors and the Association 
of the General Health Services Doctors. The latter represents two distinct 
populations—doctors who work in hospitals and doctors who work in clinics. 
Second, the IMA represents all levels of doctors—from interns to hospital 
general managers—within a single union and one bargaining unit. 
Medical care in Israel is predominantly public and semi-public. Although 
private medicine has been expanding in recent years, it serves only a small 
fraction of the population. Medicine is dominated by two large employers: the 
Histadrut-affiliated provider General Health Services (Clalit) and the state. 
Clalit is the primary provider of healthcare to more than half of Israel’s 
population. It owns and runs sixteen hospitals and 206 health-maintenance 
organization (HMO) clinics, and employs two-thirds of the 16,000 members of 
the IMA. The state runs twenty-one hospitals and twelve mental-health centers. 
In addition, several hospitals are owned by the municipalities of Tel Aviv and 
Haifa and by non-profit associations, as well as several hundred clinics run by 
two other medium-sized, semi-public HMO-type providers of medical services. 
 
 3. The expression “Labor State” was meant to reflect the unique role of the largest labor union—
the Histadrut—in the history of the new nation. The Histadrut was founded in 1920, twenty-eight years 
before the State of Israel. It functioned as a government in anticipation of a government, and amassed 
enormous economic and political power and influence. NADAV SAFRAN, THE UNITED STATES AND 
ISRAEL 84 (1963). Since statehood, the Histadrut has historically been party to all economic and social-
welfare initiatives of national concern. 
 4. Yitchak Haberfeld, Yinon Cohen, Guy Mundlak & Yitchak Saporta, Union Density in Israel 
2000–2006: Years of Stagnation, 12 LAB., SOC’Y & L. 1, 5 (2009). 
 5. These professionals include journalists, teachers, university professors, and research employees 
at the Defense Ministry. 
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Doctors’ salaries and working conditions are governed by a nationwide 
multi-employer collective agreement,6 traditionally signed by the IMA on the 
one hand and the major employers on the other. The other employers in the 
industry either join the agreement7 or follow the nationwide agreement norms 
as “units of direct impact.”8 The chief negotiator representing the employers is 
the Director of the Wage and Labor Agreements Division, a division of the 
Finance Ministry that administers and enforces the wage-control program. Since 
1985, the public sector in Israel has been under strict wage control. Employers 
in the public sector are not allowed to increase wages or benefits to employees 
either collectively or individually without the consent of the Director. 
Considering that the state is the second largest healthcare employer and that 
all major organizations that employ doctors are funded by the state,9 the 
Director of the Wage and Labor Agreements Division plays a leading role in 
contract negotiations when changes to doctors’ wages or benefits are being 
sought. 
The Director of the Wage and Labor Agreements Division is not always 
alone in the leadership seat. Since 1995, another division in the Finance 
Ministry—the Budget Division—has been increasingly active in labor contract 
negotiations. From time to time, when both the Director of the Wage and 
Labor Agreements Division and the relevant minister have been politically or 
professionally weak, the Budget Division has taken the lead as chief negotiator. 
B.  The Strike of 2000 
In March 2000, the IMA called a strike of all doctors in the hospitals and 
HMO-type clinics in Israel. The union’s collective agreement had expired in 
1998 and the parties had been negotiating for two years with no progress. The 
IMA had not anticipated the negotiations to be so protracted and difficult; in 
the previous round of negotiations in 1994, it had been able to convince the 
Finance Minister to agree to a sixty-percent salary increase with minimal 
pressure. This time the IMA had asked to double hourly pay, overhaul the 
compensation package, and, as an interim measure, expand the salary base used 
for calculating all benefits, including pension, on-duty, and on-call payments. 
The goal was to end the perceived incongruence between doctors’ investment in 
schooling, level of responsibility, status, and difficult working conditions, on the 
one hand, and their low hourly wage, on the other. When the negotiations failed 
 
 6. This type of collective agreement is common in the public sector and is referred to in the case 
law as a “pluralistic special collective agreement.” See LA 4-12/83 Histadrut v. Ports Authority 17 PD 
18 [1983] (Isr.); LA 4-15/85 Union of Academicians in Humanities & Soc. Sciences. v. State of Israel 18 
PDA 113 [1986] (Isr.).  
 7. The Collective Agreements Law of 1957 provides special procedures for joining a collective 
agreement. See Collective Agreements Law, 5717–1957, 11 LSI 58, 59 (1957) (Isr.). 
 8. Arnold R. Weber, Stability and Change in the Structure of Collective Bargaining, in 
CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 13, 14 (Lloyd Ulman ed., 1967). 
 9. Thus falling under the definition of “public sector” for the purpose of wage-control legislation. 
See Budgetary Principles Law, 5745–1985, 39 LSI 61, 75 (1985) (Isr.). 
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to change this incongruence, the IMA called a strike, which had been planned 
and prepared in advance.10 
Because private medical care serves only a small fraction of the nation, the 
strike had a devastating impact on the public at large. As the strike continued, 
suffering mounted and public outcry grew; there was enormous pressure on the 
government to intervene, either by ordering the Finance Minister to accept 
doctors’ demands or by invoking emergency regulations compelling doctors to 
return to work.11 
At the same time, the IMA considered ways to escalate the strike. In Israel, 
doctors’ strikes are rarely full strikes; this was no exception. The IMA had not 
actually taken the extreme step of calling for a total walkout. Instead, it 
engaged in a partial strike in which once a week the doctors worked with a 
skeleton crew on a rotating basis and in various locations. In addition, they 
performed only life-saving operations and severely curtailed services in 
outpatient clinics. Although the doctors were praised by Government officials 
and the media for conducting a noble and moral strike,12 the IMA felt its 
reluctance to further endanger patients’ health was being mischaracterized by 
the Finance Ministry to harden the government’s position. Hence, the union 
threatened a total walkout, which would have left only skeleton crews at 
hospitals to deal with extreme emergencies.13 
C.  Mediation in Action: From Crisis to Strategic Mediation14 
By May 27, 2000, the doctors had been on strike for more than ten weeks. 
The Prime Minister asked the parties to enter mediation to be conducted by a 
 
 10. See MORDEHAI ALON, THE POWER OF NEGOTIATING—FROM STRIKE TO ARBITRATION 37–
47 (2009) (offering a full account of the IMA’s preparations and the strike). 
 11. Under Article 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948, the government may 
authorize the Prime Minister or any other minister to issue emergency regulations in the interests of the 
defense of the state, public security, and the maintenance of supplies and essential services. Law and 
Administration Ordinance, 5708–1948, 1 LSI 7, 8 (1948) (Isr.). The emergency regulations usually 
authorize government officers or managers in both public and private undertakings to issue specific 
back-to-work orders on an ad hoc basis under which particular employees or groups of employees are 
temporarily denied the freedom to strike. Mordehai Mironi, Back to Work Emergency Orders; 
Government Intervention in Labor Disputes in Essential Services, 15 HEBREW U. L. REV. 350, 350–88 
(1986). According to one source, it was the Prime Minister who opposed the initiative to issue back-to-
work emergency orders. ALON, supra note 10, at 88. 
 12. ALON, supra note 10, at 98, 128, 174–75. The strike was nicknamed a “Chocolate Strike.” Id. at 
176. 
 13. To prevent the government from relocating the doctors back to work through emergency 
orders, the IMA considered sending all the anesthesiologists to Cyprus, leaving all operating rooms 
idle. The underlying idea was that there were only 400 anesthesiologists and that the emergency back-
to-work orders were not exterritorial. Id. at 136–37. 
 14. See generally MOTI MORDEHAI MIRONI, MEDIATION AND STRATEGIC CHANGE LESSONS 
FROM MEDIATING A NATIONWIDE DOCTORS’ STRIKE (2008) [hereinafter MEDIATION AND 
STRATEGIC CHANGE] (offering a full account of the doctors’ mediation). 
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well-known businessman15 and a professional private mediator.16 This was 
unexpected. Unlike the United States, Canada, and certain other Western 
countries, Israel has no tradition of third-party involvement in labor disputes 
either in the form of mediation or arbitration. In the rare cases in which 
intervention had been used, the third parties were Histadrut leaders,17 
politicians,18 and the Labor Courts.19 
The Finance Minister and the government negotiators grudgingly assented 
to the Prime Minister’s idea to use mediation. The IMA welcomed the Prime 
Minister’s proposal, but rejected the government’s request that the doctors 
discontinue the strike while mediation was in progress.20 The IMA officials were 
concerned that the government had no intention of reaching a settlement; they 
feared that mediation was merely a device to bring the strike to an end just as 
the government was beginning to feel the political pressure. During the pre-
mediation executive session, the government finally agreed that the status quo 
would be maintained for the period of time assigned for the mediation,21 that is, 
there would be neither discontinuance nor escalation of the strike.22 
With the strike entering its eleventh week, the mediation was expected to be 
short-lived—a classic crisis mediation. It turned out to be neither short nor crisis 
mediation. It was a long journey, which ended in a strategic agreement, one that 
not only settled the strike, but also had the potential to transform the landscape 
of labor-management and employment relations in Israel’s public healthcare 
industry. 
1.  The Mediation Team 
The mediation team was composed of two co-mediators, two assistant 
mediators, and a spokesperson.23 The team members were selected for their 
ability to address specific roadblocks that might occur during the mediation 
process. For example, it was expected that the parties would have sharp 
disagreements regarding the database and methodology for analyzing the 
 
 15. The well-known businessman was Michael Federman, who is the President and CEO of 
Federmann Enterprises, Chairman of the Boards of Elbit Systems and Dan Hotels Corporation, and 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
 16. The professional private mediator was Mordehai (Moti) Mironi, the author of this article. 
 17. See Ruth Ben Israel & Mordehai Mironi, The Role of Neutrals in the Resolution of Interest 
Disputes in Israel, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 356, 360 (1989) (noting that the current General Secretary of 
Histadrut has recently been involved in a third-party capacity in many labor disputes and strikes of 
non-Histadrut-affiliated unions). 
 18. The first attempt at third-party intervention in the doctors’ strike was made by the Director of 
the Parliament Finance Commission. See ALON, supra note 10, at 82–83. 
 19. See Mordehai Mironi, Labor Courts’ Involvement in Labor Disputes in the Public Sector, LAW 
& GOV’T (forthcoming).  
 20. In Israel, the government traditionally does not negotiate with workers who are striking. 
 21. The parties initially agreed to limit the mediation to two or three weeks. 
 22. See supra text accompanying note 11 (detailing the plans for escalating the strike). 
 23. The assistant mediators were Mr. Jonathan Kowarsky and Gershon Rodich. The former is an 
attorney and a full-time mediator and the latter is a mediator with a strong background in economics. 
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economic implications of possible proposals. Hence, one of the mediators was 
selected because of his proficiency in economics and data analysis. Moreover, 
because the strike was big news and mediation requires strict confidentiality, 
the parties accepted the mediators’ request for a media blackout and hired a 
spokesperson. The spokesperson’s duty was to issue joint statements, keep the 
media off the premises where negotiations were being conducted, and help 
monitor the parties’ compliance with the media-blackout ground rules. 
2.  Special Challenges 
From the outset, it was clear this was not a run of the mill interest labor 
mediation. This observation was reinforced as the mediation was progressing 
due to the accumulative effect of four interrelated issues: (1) the 
multidimensionality of the dispute, (2) the unbridgeable gap between the 
parties’ positions, (3) the messy employment and labor relations in public 
healthcare, and (4) the poor history of negotiations. 
a. The Multidimensional Character of the Dispute 
The dispute was multi-issue, multi-party, and multi-layered. It was both 
inter- and intra-organizational; there was a high level of heterogeneity and 
diversity of interests on both sides as well as intricate relationships between 
players, both institutionally and personally. The high stakes involved were not 
limited to the IMA demands; they included the wide scope of the direct and 
indirect impact of potential outcomes (a “polycentric dispute”).24 That the 
mediation was conducted at the height of a long strike under threat of 
escalation further complicated matters by adding high levels of visibility, greater 
urgency and intensity, and the uninvited involvement of politicians, including 
the Prime Minister. 
b. The Unbridgeable Gap Between the Parties’ Positions  
Highlights of the IMA’s demands included increasing doctors’ base salaries 
by 100 percent and overhauling the compensation structure in order to avoid 
the sharp decline in earnings during non-work periods, such as paid vacation, 
study leave, sick leave, and pensions. As an interim measure, the IMA asked to 
expand the salary base used for calculating these benefits by including on-duty 
and on-call payments. 
The employers had demands too. They wanted to transfer state-employed 
doctors from a budgetary to a contributory pension fund and introduce some 
form of punch clock. As to the IMA’s principal demand for a salary increase, 
the employers were unable to offer even a compromise figure. The government 
had committed to a strict wage policy. Negotiated wage increases were limited 
to the expected rate of inflation. For the doctors, this meant a long contract and 
a five-percent increase. 
 
 24. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394 (1978). 
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c. The Messy Employment and Labor Relations  
The messy employment and labor relations of doctors in public healthcare 
were attributable to three strategic or systemic problems: (1) a convoluted 
compensation structure and the absence of a clear distinction between public 
healthcare and private practice in public hospitals and outside them; (2) the 
perceived lack of institutional flexibility in the public health system to embrace 
change (a classic example of the “tyranny of the status quo”);25 and (3) that 
public healthcare appeared to be a complex interconnected web—a patchwork 
of policies, rules, procedures, practices, and local arrangements that had 
developed over the years. The Arbitration Award later termed this the 
“equilibrium of deformations.”26 Due to the complexity, any meaningful change 
in one place in the system would likely cause difficulties up and down the line. 
d. The Poor Negotiations History 
Party leaders, who appeared to be skillful and experienced professionals, 
had been negotiating for over two years; the previous four-year agreement 
having expired two years before. During that time and despite intensive effort, 
they had been unable to reach agreement on a single issue. 
Moreover, there were four unresolved issues that had been referred to 
continuous negotiations through a bipartite labor-management committee in 
1994.27 Although these were classic “integrative issues,”28 six years later, they 
were still unresolved. 
3.  Mediation Contribution 
The mediation process contributed uniquely to the negotiations in two ways. 
First and foremost, it transformed party discourse and relationships. Second, it 
led the parties to capitalize on their mutual frustrations29 and construct by 
mutual consent innovative processes (that is, the “Public Commission” and the 
arbitration) aimed at overcoming the messy labor relations and the parties’ 
 
 25. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, TYRANNY OF THE STATUS QUO 6 (1984). 
 26. Arbitration Award, Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 3 (Nov. 26, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).  
 27. The bipartite or parity committee consists of equal numbers of representatives (usually only 
one or two) from labor and management. They are neither neutral nor partisan. They are identified 
with the disputants but are at least one step removed (geographically or hierarchically) from the locus 
of the dispute. Being a dyad decision-making body, all decisions must be unanimous. The procedure 
operates as an informal, small-scale negotiation session between the parties’ appointees who maintain 
close contact with the disputants. In case of disagreement, the dispute is usually referred to a single 
arbitrator. 
 28. “Integrative issues” in the sense that the employers had the same interest as the doctors in 
resolving these long-standing problems. See RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A 
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL INTERACTION 
SYSTEM 144–59 (1965). One proof was the fact that, in the mediation, these four issues appeared on 
both sides’ list of demands. 
 29. The parties were deeply frustrated with their inability to effectuate changes that had been long 
overdue as well as with the two years of negotiations that had preceded the strike and the ten weeks of 
negotiations that preceded the mediation. 
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inability to negotiate to finality. These processes were intended to give doctors 
hope that the unbridgeable gap between the parties’ positions would be 
addressed gradually as part of a systemic and strategic overhaul of the public 
health system. 
Party representatives entered the mediation combatively with a high level of 
animosity, tension, mistrust, and pessimism, all resulting from two years of 
abortive negotiations and sewer labor relations. Following a relatively short 
period of mediation, the parties discovered its miraculous potential for 
transformation. The parties learned the virtues of interest-based dialogue and 
how to converse in a non-confrontational, polite, and productive way. After 
hundreds of hours of barren negotiations, the parties discovered that they were 
capable of agreeing, and, more importantly, speaking and actually listening to 
each other. 
Evidence of the depth and strength of the transformation can be seen in (1) 
the relatively smooth adjustment of lawyers who joined the mediation at its tail 
end and had not undergone the transformative process during the first weeks; 
(2) the ease of forming and working through multi-party teams, such as the 
“Economic Table,”30 the “Legal Table,”31 and the “Arbitration Team;”32 and (3) 
the parties’ cooperation in launching a last minute “side-table”33 mediation in 
order to resolve the issue of interns’ working hours, which threatened to stall 
the signing of the agreement. 
4.  The Settlement 
The settlement reached after more than two years of negotiations, 127 days 
on strike, and forty-two days of marathon-style mediation was revolutionary 
and innovative, and had potentially far-reaching implications for the medical 
profession. Furthermore, it was the first time in the history of Israel that a large 
and powerful union had given up its right to strike creating a sheltered, non-
violent strike-free environment. 
The settlement comprised three elements; the first was results-oriented, and 
the last two, dealing with strategic issues, were process-oriented. Each 
addressed a different timeframe. The first was short-term: the collective 
agreement. Its underlying goal was not only to improve doctors’ income, but 
also to address the long-standing and pressing problems of doctors’ pensions, 
 
 30. The “Economic Table” was a tripartite task force comprised of one representative from the 
Wage and Labor Agreements Division, the IMA’s accountant, and one of the assistant mediators 
whose mission was to resolve issues of data collection and analysis of costs. See MEDIATION AND 
STRATEGIC CHANGE, supra note 14, at 52–54. 
 31. The “Legal Table” was a tripartite team composed of lawyers and non-lawyers charged with 
working out the details and drafting the collective agreement. See id. at 52–53. 
 32. The “Arbitration Team” was a tripartite team composed of lawyers responsible for developing 
and drafting the no-strike arbitration agreement. See id. at 54–62. 
 33. Referring to the last-minute mediation between a multi-party task force of second-tier 
representatives who negotiated with representatives of the Interns Association—a group that was 
recognized neither by the IMA nor by the employers, but was needed in order to effectuate the deal. 
See id. at 64–68. 
MIRONI 5/2/2011   
Summer 2011] ADR AND INTEREST LABOR DISPUTES IN HEALTHCARE 209 
the convoluted salary structure, and interns’ working hours. In return, new 
doctors entering state employment would be transferred from a budgetary to a 
contributory pension plan. The second component was a public commission, 
which would be appointed by the Prime Minister to study the public healthcare 
system, examine the status of doctors from a systemic approach, and make 
recommendations for future action. The third and most daring component was 
the long-range agreement under which the IMA would give up its power to 
strike for the next ten years. In return, public health employers would give up 
their decision-making power regarding doctors’ remuneration and working 
conditions. As a result, there would be no doctors’ strikes and reason would 
replace force as the arbiter. 
The settlement was welcomed by all with hope and optimism.34 The parties 
believed they were about to embark on an experiment in a completely new style 
of labor relations. The public and policymakers hoped that if this pilot project 
succeeded, not only might it be extended to other essential services, but it could 
also change the culture of labor negotiations in Israel. Finally, that the parties 
were able to settle their dispute and find an integrative solution attested to the 
value of mediation. 
III 
THE NO-STRIKE ARBITRATION MODEL IN ACTION 
The seeds of change planted during the mediation started to grow almost 
immediately. One of the mediators was asked to assist the parties’ lawyers in 
concluding their negotiations over the design of the arbitration procedures. 
Given the euphoria and the cooperative relationships, the dialogue was smooth 
and productive. Shortly afterward, the Prime Minister began his search for 
candidates for the Public Commission, which was appointed five months after 
the agreement was signed. The future could not have looked better. 
Unfortunately, since then everything has gone downhill; all of the goodwill, the 
enthusiasm, the commitment, and the dreams have seemingly evaporated. This 
sad chapter is the theme of the following sections. 
A.  The Point of Departure 
The solution35 that ended the strike assured uninterrupted medical care for a 
period of ten years through final and binding arbitration as a quid pro quo for a 
blanket no-strike obligation. This meant arbitration not in lieu of court 
litigation, but in lieu of strife. In addition, the agreement attempted to deal with 
 
 34. As observed by Sever Plozker—a very prominent journalist. See ALON, supra note 10, at 193–
94. 
 35. The term “solution” is used since the parties agreed to sign two collective agreements (one 
dealing with salary, fringe benefits, and working conditions, and one dealing with the no-strike 
arbitration). The government’s obligations regarding the formation of the Public Commission and its 
mandate would be formalized by a letter signed by the Prime Minister. 
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two strategic issues that made it impossible to introduce any meaningful change 
in the organization of medical care and working conditions, even ones desired 
by all parties. First, the public healthcare system suffered from systemic 
problems and a convoluted system of human resource management for doctors. 
Second, the parties were facing difficulties in bargaining to conclusion. 
In order to address the first issue, the government undertook to nominate a 
“Public Commission” chartered to investigate the public healthcare system and 
the status of doctors. The expectation was that the Public Commission’s 
recommendations would stir public-policy debate causing the parliament and 
the government to introduce systemic and structural changes that would cure 
the public healthcare system’s problems and improve doctors’ status and the 
quality of their working lives. In addition, it would produce a database, 
infrastructure, and recommendations for future changes in working conditions 
to be discussed and negotiated by the parties. Finally, although the Public 
Commission’s recommendations would be non-binding, they could be of 
assistance and guidance to the arbitration board. 
The existence of a final and binding arbitration procedure, to be invoked 
unilaterally in case of failure to reach agreement, was supposed to address the 
second issue. The idea was that the threat of losing control over decision-
making and the embedded uncertainty as to the outcomes would enhance direct 
negotiations between the parties (that is, the “deterrence effect”). Furthermore, 
in case the parties failed to agree on all or part of the issues, the arbitration 
board would bring finality. 
B.  The Public Commission 
The government had undertaken to appoint the Public Commission within 
sixty days. In fact, it took five months. In December 2000,36 the Prime Minister 
appointed the seven-member Public Commission, chaired by a former 
parliament member and Assistant Finance Minister, to investigate the public 
healthcare system and the status of doctors. The Public Commission was given a 
broad mandate and was asked to deliver its findings and non-binding 
recommendations within a period of six to twelve months. The public 
employers and the IMA submitted voluminous studies and working papers to 
the Commission. The Commission itself solicited position papers from different 
stakeholders, conducted fifty hearings, and met with experts. 
In January 2003, the Public Commission issued its 264-page final report 
recommending, inter alia, the parties sign a collective agreement aimed at 
reforming the employment relations and remuneration system in public 
healthcare within eighteen months.37 Soon thereafter, the IMA discovered that, 
although the Health Ministry had fully embraced the Public Commission’s 
 
 36. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 8. 
 37. Id. at 6. 
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report and recommendations,38 the government had no intention of considering 
the report, let alone implementing its recommendations.39 Several attempts by 
the IMA40 to change the government’s attitude towards the report failed. A 
statement made by the State’s Attorney to the High Court of Justice41 said 
bluntly that the state had fulfilled its obligation towards the IMA by creating 
the Public Commission. 
The IMA petitioned42 the High Court of Justice to order the government to 
consider the report. The court gave a consent judgment ordering the 
government to create a task force representing the Finance and Health 
Ministries, the State Service Commissioner, the Attorney General, and the 
Prime Minister’s Office. The task force would consult with the IMA and would 
later bring the report before the government or the Social and Economic 
Cabinet. The task force never invited the IMA to its deliberations nor honored 
the IMA’s request to receive the records of the meetings. 
The fact that no attention was paid to the Public Commission’s 
recommendations was not the only setback for the IMA. Far more problematic 
was that, for reasons beyond the IMA’s control, waiting for the report caused a 
long, and in retrospect, unfortunate delay in launching the first round of 
negotiations and arbitration under the new model. 
C.  The Long Way to Arbitration 
According to the collective agreement that ended the strike, negotiations 
were scheduled to resume in July 2001 and the arbitration could be invoked six 
months later. The IMA did not initiate the negotiations in time for two reasons. 
First, a series of terrifying terrorist attacks and data indicating a severe 
economic slowdown immediately after the 2001 election caused the government 
to adopt a strict wage freeze for fiscal years 2001 through 2003.43 Second, the 
IMA was waiting for the Public Commission’s report in order to substantiate its 
demand for the coming negotiations and arbitration. When the report was 
finally completed, the IMA discovered it was too late. 
Instead of being the “moving and demanding” side, the IMA found itself 
running a defensive battle, trying to block the government’s initiative to 
temporarily cut doctors’ salaries by twelve to seventeen percent. These 
intended wage cuts were part of the austerity measures aimed at economic 
recovery by encouraging growth. The plan (named “The Economic Plan”) had 
 
 38. See IMA’s Position Paper at 5–6, Submitted to the Social and Economic Cabinet (Sept. 2008).  
 39. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 10. 
 40. One request was made to the Division Director of Wage and Collective Agreements at the 
Finance Ministry. His response was that the Prime Minister had first to decide whether to accept all or 
part of the recommendations along with the timetable for implementation. See ALON, supra note 10, at 
234. 
 41. Id. at 236. 
 42. HCJ 3932/03 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel [2005] (unpublished) (Isr.). 
 43. The Treasury Minister and the Director of Wage and Collective Agreements declared that the 
wage freeze was just a first step in the more severe austerity measures. 
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been agreed upon through concession bargaining with the Histadrut. Although 
the IMA is not part of the Histadrut,44 the Government-initiated legislation 
extended the agreed-upon measures to all public-sector employees.45 
The IMA requested that the Prime Minister, the Finance and Health 
Ministers, the State Service Commissioner, and the Attorney General discuss 
the government’s “Economic Plan” at the bargaining table and in arbitration 
under the no-strike arbitration agreement. The IMA’s plea was rejected on the 
ground that the “Economic Plan” was exterritorial to the no-strike arbitration 
agreement.46 The IMA attempted to block the intended legislation through the 
High Court of Justice47 alleging that such legislation would constitute a breach 
of contact. Chief Justice Barak was sympathetic to the IMA’s position. 
Nevertheless, the court convinced the IMA to withdraw its petition. Soon 
thereafter, the legislation was passed.48 
Disenchanted with the government’s refusal to consider the Public 
Commission’s report and its abortive attempt to block the legislation, the IMA 
petitioned the National Labor Court to compel the public employers to submit 
all outstanding issues to arbitration.49 
D.  The Court Ushers the Parties into Arbitration 
While it was clear the IMA had wanted arbitration all along, the public 
employers had to be forced into it by the court. This asymmetric attitude was 
evident from the state’s arguments to which all other public employers readily 
joined. In complete disregard of the language and the underlying intention of 
the no-strike arbitration agreement, the state submitted a three-pronged 
argument to the court.50 First, wage policy is the domain of the government, not 
of an arbitrator. Second, only the parties have the authority to decide on the 
total cost of the agreement (that is, the arbitrator can only decide on its 
allocation among parties’ demands). Third, in signing the no-strike arbitration 
agreement, the parties had intended that only a limited number of issues would 
be brought before the arbitrator, leaving the majority of issues to be agreed 
upon by the parties. It is noteworthy the state clung to these arguments, 
knowing that the parties had been through fruitless negotiations for twelve 
months. 
 
 44. See supra note 5. 
 45. In addition to cutting doctors’ income, the bill contained several rationing measures and 
organizational changes that had a direct impact on doctors’ working environments. In particular, the 
bill led to further deterioration in areas such as doctors’ pensions and malpractice insurance. 
 46. ALON, supra note 10, at 237. 
 47. HCJ 3932/03 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel [2005] (unpublished) (Isr.). 
 48. The Israel Economy Recovery Law (Legislation Changes Aimed at Achieving Targeted 
Budget and Economic Policy for Fiscal Years 2002–2003) 2003. 
 49. LC 9/03 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 40 PDA 821 [2005] (Isr.).  
 50. Interim Decision, May 30, 2005, LC 9/03 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 40 PDA 821 [2005] 
(Isr.). 
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The National Labor Court rejected the state’s arguments. It appraised the 
no-strike agreement as a breakthrough in labor relations, which translated into 
practice the desirable public policy of settling labor disputes peacefully without 
a strike.51 The court was determined to make the no-strike arbitration work. 
The National Labor Court conducted several hearings and issued three 
decisions that paved the way for the arbitration: 
1.  The first decision was in fact a consent judgment. The court assisted 
the parties in agreeing on a stay for a limited period during which 
they would negotiate under the supervision of the court.52 
2. The second53 was rendered fourteen months later and contained 
four operative messages. First, the court declared the parties had 
exhausted the negotiations phase and the dispute was ripe for 
arbitration.54 Second, the court drew up a list of subjects that fell 
under the arbitration’s jurisdiction. The court cautioned itself that it 
must interpret the agreement prudently since, for all those 
involved, this was an innovative and experimental endeavor.55 
Third, the court allowed the parties a short period to select an 
arbitrator or an arbitration board by mutual consent and provided a 
procedure by which it would appoint if parties failed to select on 
their own. Fourth, the court ordered the arbitration to commence 
within one month. Finally, because no agreement had been reached 
through the prolonged and direct negotiations, the court advised 
the parties to consider using mediation.56 
3.  The third decision57 completed the role of the court as a producer of 
the arbitration. The court appointed the three neutral arbitrators 
and decided their fees, as well as the initial allocation of cost 
between the parties. Finally, the court empowered the arbitrators to 
interpret its previous decision about what was subject to arbitration 
using their own discretion.58 
In addition to the practical aspects, the three decisions reflected the court’s 
determination to make the no-strike arbitration model work. Fearing that the 
controversy over arbitrators’ fees would prolong the arbitration,59 the court 
interpreted its authority to appoint an arbitrator to include matters of fees. The 
court went far in criticizing the state’s attitude towards the arbitration. It 
 
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. Interim Decision, Mar. 31, 2004, Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel [2005] (unpublished) (Isr.). 
 53. Interim Decision, May 30, 2005, Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 40 PDA 821 [2005] (Isr.).  
 54. Id. at 7. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 11. 
 57. Interim Decision, Aug. 25, 2005, Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 40 PDA 821 [2005] (Isr.). 
 58. Id. at 3. 
 59. Id. at 2. 
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emphasized the arbitration was not in a dispute between two individual entities 
involved in a discrete transaction but rather within a context of a collective 
dispute and continuing relationship. Hence, the state had the duty to act in good 
faith to enable the arbitration to proceed. The results of these three decisions 
set the stage, the cast, and the tone for the arbitration. 
IV 
THE ARBITRATION BOARD 
The economic crisis of 2001 and the “Economic Plan” of 200360 were not the 
only exogenous factors that caused serious delay in the arbitration. Another 
important factor was a series of independent and unexpected events that led to 
an unusually high turnover of arbitrators on the arbitration board. 
The no-strike arbitration agreement provided two options for the structure 
and composition of the arbitration board:61 (1) a classical tripartite board with 
one neutral arbitrator and two partisan arbitrators, and (2) a neutral–skewed 
tripartite board composed of three neutral members and two partisan 
arbitrators. The parties chose the latter. This may partially explain the 
magnitude of problems encountered by the arbitration board. 
A.  The High Turnover of Arbitration Board Members 
The makeup of the arbitration board and the emerging dynamics among its 
members are the most important factors in any major arbitration. This is 
especially true in a high-stakes, complex, and polycentric62 arbitration conducted 
by a five-member tripartite board. Thus, from a process perspective, a turnover 
of 100 percent in board membership was a serious cause of delay and a major 
obstacle to board functionality. 
According to the agreement, the parties were charged with the selection of 
the neutral arbitrators. The parties asked the National Labor Court twice63 to 
assist in the selection process and finally the court appointed the three neutral 
arbitrators.64 The identities of the two partisan arbitrators—the IMA’s 
Chairman and the Director of the Wage and Collective Agreements Division at 
the Finance Ministry—were already dictated in the no-strike agreement. 
 
 60. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 61. See generally An Innovative Model for Contract Renewal Negotiations and Arbitration—The 
Mediators’ Proposal, in GENERAL COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION AND STATE OF ISRAEL 20000587, GENERAL HEALTH SERVICES, AND HADASSAH 
(June 13, 2005), available at http://www.tamas.gov.il.  
 62. See Fuller, supra note 24, at 394. See also LC 9/03, supra note 49. 
 63. See Interim Decision, May 30, 2005, LC 9/03 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 40 PDA 821 
[2005] (Isr.); Interim Decision, Aug. 7, 2005, LC 9/03 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 40 PDA 821 
[2005] (Isr.).  
 64. Interim Decision, Aug. 7, 2005, LC 9/03 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 40 PDA 821 [2005] 
(Isr.). 
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In addition, during the four-year period, there were five changes in the 
composition of the arbitration board. Only two arbitrators, one neutral 
arbitrator and one partisan arbitrator, served the full term. Two neutral 
arbitrators, one of them the first chairman, resigned. The partisan arbitrator 
representing the state and other public employers—the Director of the Wage 
and Collective Agreements Division—had to be replaced three times; twice 
because those who held this office left and once because the newly appointed 
Director passed away suddenly after a very short time in office. 
B.  The Confusion and Misconception as to the Partisan Arbitrators’ Role 
The tripartite structure is a new paradigm in Israel’s labor relations and 
arbitration scene. The only known decision-making bodies that are neither 
purely neutral nor mutually selected are the bipartite committees65 and the dyad 
arbitration board, that is, a two-member arbitration board composed of parties’ 
appointees.66 Fear of the unknown67 was probably the reason the parties chose a 
hybrid model—a neutral–skewed tripartite board. In retrospect, this choice 
intensified the confusion regarding the partisan arbitrators’ role. The 
differentiating line between a party’s appointee in a three-member arbitration 
board or in a dyad arbitration board, on the one hand, and a partisan arbitrator 
in a tripartite structure, on the other hand, was unclear. This misunderstanding 
was shared by all—the arbitrators, the court, and the parties. It came up in the 
records of the arbitration proceedings and the Arbitration Award, as well as in 
court decisions and interviews. 
At a relatively early stage,68 the arbitration board decided to hold two types 
of meetings: one for the neutral arbitrators only, and another less-frequent 
meeting for the whole arbitration board. Another practice of segregation 
involved disallowing the partisan arbitrators’ free access to economic analyses 
and legal opinions prepared by the arbitration board’s consultants upon request 
 
 65. See supra note 27. This arbitration model can also be found in Islamic family law for cases of 
divorce. See Ottoman’s Family’s Rights Law 1917 § 130; HCJ 11230/05 Hanan Ibraheem Muasi v. The 
Sheria Appeal Ct. in Jerusalem (unpublished) (Isr.) (available in Nevo on Mar. 7, 2007). 
 66. This model of arbitration (in Hebrew “Zabla”) is commonly used for civil and labor disputes. 
Similar to the bipartite committee, there is an even number of decision-makers, almost always two, and 
each is selected by one disputant. The difference is that under this arbitration model, the arbitrators are 
expected to be quasi-neutral. They conduct a full arbitration hearing and issue a final and binding 
arbitration award. If they fail to reach a unanimous decision, the disputants or the two arbitrators 
choose a neutral arbitrator. The newly elected neutral arbitrator may act as a single arbitrator or join 
the partisan arbitrators as chairman of a three members arbitration board holding a controlling vote. 
See 1 SMADAR OTTOLENGHI, ARBITRATION: LAW AND PROCEDURE 367–70 (4th ed. 2005). 
 67. It should be emphasized that the difficulty was not the triadic structure. A three-member 
arbitration board with two parties’ appointees as quasi-neutral arbitrators and a neutral arbitrator is 
common. The “unknown” refers to the partisan arbitrators who are neither quasi-neutral nor one step 
removed like the members of the bipartite committee. They are the disputants’ leaders. 
 68. Arbitration Interim Decision, May 4, 2007, Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel [2007] 
(unpublished) (Isr.) (confirmed by Arbitration Decision, Oct. 6, 2008, Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of 
Israel [2008] (unpublished) (Isr.)).  
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of the neutral arbitrators.69 As justification, the arbitration board relied on a 
court decision denying the public employers’ request to order the arbitration 
board to share with the parties any legal opinions and economic working papers 
being used.70 This reasoning ignores the fact that partisan arbitrators are by 
definition full-fledged arbitrators with equal power in a five-member arbitration 
board. 
In a later decision,71 the arbitration board attempted to define the partisan 
arbitrators’ role. The decision emphasizes that, as a general rule, a party’s 
appointed arbitrator is akin to a director in a corporation. Once in office, he 
must distance himself from the party who appointed him. The decision admitted 
that this arbitration was an exception. The partisan arbitrators were not 
independent. Furthermore, they were in positions that made it only legitimate 
to be in touch with those who had appointed them. Nonetheless, toward the end 
of the arbitration, when the arbitration board would deliberate and make the 
final decision, the partisan arbitrators would be expected to distance themselves 
from the parties. 
This statement is not clear since many decisions taken throughout the 
arbitration proceedings may impact the final outcome and be as important as 
the final decision. Furthermore, the arbitration board was cognizant of the 
importance of its interim decisions when it emphasized that the forum of the 
neutral arbitrators would be devoted to exchanging ideas and that the decision 
would be made only by the full arbitration board.72 
The state and public employers did not buy into the court’s seemingly 
appeasing statement. They were afraid the neutral arbitrators intended to 
distance themselves from the partisan arbitrators, segregating them and taking 
away their right to fully participate in the decision-making. In retrospect, the 
state and public employers’ fears were well grounded. They were also the only 
ones to correctly understand the essence of the tripartite structure. 
The state and Clalit petitioned the National Labor Court towards the end of 
the arbitration73 to stop all meetings of the neutral arbitrators’ forum and order 
all working meetings be conducted with the full arbitration board. The court 
denied the petition on two grounds.74 First, the limitation placed upon the 
neutral arbitrators not to make decisions without the partisan arbitrators was a 
sufficient safeguard. Second, the partisan arbitrators had expressed no 
complaints. 
 
 69. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 24. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Arbitration Interim Decision, Mar. 26, 2008, Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel [2008] 
(unpublished) (Isr.). 
 72. Arbitration Interim Decision, June 10, 2008, Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel [2008] 
(unpublished) (Isr.). 
 73. LC 12/08 State of Israel v. Israel Med. Ass’n [2008] (unpublished) (Isr.). 
 74. Id. at 18–19. 
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The misunderstanding as to the partisan arbitrators’ role peaked during the 
last days, just before the Arbitration Award was signed and released. In 
contrast to their prior obligation, the neutral arbitrators did not invite the 
partisan arbitrators to the deliberations. The partisan arbitrators were neither 
involved in the final decision-making process nor in drafting the Arbitration 
Award. Furthermore, the neutral arbitrators refused to show the draft to the 
partisan arbitrators. The state and other public employers approached the court 
again with an urgent petition for an injunction to prevent the release of the 
Arbitration Award before their partisan arbitrator read it and expressed his 
position.75 
The court ignored the fact that the neutral arbitrators had acted in violation 
of their prior obligation as sanctioned by the court.76 It also disregarded the fact 
that the partisan arbitrators were actually the leaders of the parties and not 
quasi-neutral arbitrators. The court ordered the arbitration board’s chairman to 
give the draft of the Arbitration Award to the partisan arbitrators but directed 
these arbitrators not to divulge any information discussed during the 
deliberation to anyone.77 
The court’s order would enable the partisan arbitrators to fulfill just one 
important function of the tripartite board in contract-renewal arbitration: 
improving the practicality and workability of the award by avoiding 
unintentional mistakes stemming from the neutral arbitrators’ unfamiliarity 
with the complexities and intricacies of labor relations and working conditions. 
One obstacle, however, still remained—the strict confidentiality. 
The confidentiality requirement created difficulties for the partisan 
arbitrator representing the state and other public employers on two levels. First, 
the partisan arbitrator was new in office as a Director of Wage and Collective 
Agreements and still learning his way. The sweeping confidentiality rules 
ignored a prior court decision78 that would have allowed him to be accompanied 
by his assistant into the arbitrators’ deliberations. Second, this partisan 
arbitrator represented two large and very distinctive employers—the state and 
Clalit. Not only does the former operate only hospitals and the latter hospitals 
and HMO clinics, Clalit’s doctors’ working conditions are sometimes different 
from the state’s. Naturally, this partisan arbitrator needed to consult with both. 
The public employers approached the court again79 asking to relieve their 
partisan arbitrator from his confidentiality obligation in order to address these 
two shortcomings. 
The court issued a consent judgment. Nonetheless, it refused the petition 
that would have enabled the arbitrator to consult and solicit data from Clalit for 
 
 75. LC 19/08 State of Israel v. Israel Med. Ass’n [2008] (unpublished) (Isr.). 
 76. They were not supposed to make the decision on their own. See LC 12/08, supra note 73, at 19. 
 77. LC 19/08, supra note 75, at 1–2. 
 78. LC 483/08 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel [2008] (unpublished) (Isr.). 
 79. Interim Decision, Nov. 23, 2008, LC 19/08 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel [2008] 
(unpublished) (Isr.). 
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the final deliberations.80 In addition to its insensitivity and misconception of the 
tripartite structure, the court’s reasoning is legally wrong. First, it wrongly 
equates a partisan arbitrator in a tripartite arbitration board with a party-
appointee arbitrator in a dyadic arbitration board. Consequently, the court 
believes once partisan arbitrators are appointed, they must sever the 
relationship with the parties they represent.81 Not only does adhering to this 
norm prevent partisan arbitrators from performing their functions in a tripartite 
structure, but it is also unfeasible given that the partisan arbitrators are the 
parties’ leaders. 
Second, the court assumes that the Arbitration Law is jus cogens, that is, a 
set of norms not subject to change through parties’ consent, and thus may not 
tolerate any other reading of the tripartite structure. In fact, there is no 
authority supporting the assertion that the Arbitration Law is indeed jus cogens 
and it is difficult to see why the tripartite structure does not fit Arbitration Law 
principles. 
In any case, the fact that the court finally enabled the partisan arbitrators to 
read the Arbitration Award before its release and to provide their input 
enabled the avoidance of unintentional mistakes. At the last moment, the basis 
for calculating the salary increase in the Arbitration Award was modified to 
permit continuation of the existing relationship between the income of doctors 
working in hospitals and their counterparts working in Clalit clinics. 
V 
THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 
The first session of the arbitration took place on December 20, 2005, four 
years after the first arbitration was supposed to begin and almost a year after 
the three neutral arbitrators had been appointed. The Arbitration Award was 
rendered almost three years later on November 26, 2008, and it covers the 
period until the end of the no-strike agreement. The IMA brought eleven issues 
for arbitration and the state and other public employers brought ten issues. The 
arbitrators conducted over twenty arbitration sessions and heard thirty 
witnesses.82 Thirteen of the sessions were plenary83 with fifty attendees, including 
the full five-member arbitration board and large party delegations accompanied 
by their legal counsels. The sessions were recorded and transcribed. 
The arbitration was very expensive. In addition to the arbitrators’ fees and 
expenses, the costs included outside consultants and lawyers who provided 
services to the board. Despite being purely non-legal interest arbitration, the 
sessions were completely dominated by the parties’ legal counsels. According to 
 
 80. Id. at 5. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Interim Decision, June 24, 2008, LC 12/08 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel [2008] 
(unpublished) (Isr.). 
 83. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 5. 
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the interviews, the latter, especially those who represented the public 
employers, could not tolerate the sans frontiers arbitration and had not 
internalized that the arbitration was a substitute for negotiations, dialogue, and 
strike. They insisted on more formal, adversarial, and litigation-like arbitration. 
Not only were they more familiar with the model, but this was also the only way 
they could envisage maintaining some control to constrain the arbitrators and to 
reduce the level of uncertainty. The IMA leadership had a different reading. 
They perceived the public employers’ legal counsels’ attitude and legal position 
as a tactic to prolong the arbitration, to intimidate and put pressure on the 
arbitrators, and to prepare ammunition for an ex post petition to quash the 
Arbitration Award. 
The interviews reveal this adversarial approach was incongruent with the 
board members’ background and their role perception. The three neutral 
arbitrators who conducted the vast majority of the arbitration sessions were not 
legal practitioners or former judges. Their fame and experience came from 
business, management, accounting, and high-level political offices. They 
accepted the appointment in order to help the parties solve an economic 
dispute promptly and efficiently. They also perceived their role as a public 
mission and an opportunity to introduce some reforms in public healthcare, 
which they labeled “equilibrium of deformations.”84 The three neutral 
arbitrators wanted to conduct open and informal arbitration.85 They preferred 
listening to people (not to testimony), canvassing and taking in as much 
information as possible, and being free to meet privately outside formal 
hearings with stakeholders and experts.86 They had no tolerance for legal 
niceties and refused to be put in the procrustean bed of court-like arbitration. 
The clash between these two approaches was evident; tension and distrust 
between the arbitrators and the state and Clalit’s counsels heightened with 
time. It did not stop at the arbitration’s hall door. A leading newspaper 
published a letter written by the state’s counsel to the arbitrators and cited an 
unnamed source at the Finance Ministry87 blaming the arbitrators for being one-
sided. Allegedly, the arbitrators were exposed to documents and data provided 
by the IMA either directly or through Ernst & Young—a consulting firm 
engaged by the arbitrators—without notifying the public employers or letting 
them see the materials and respond. The letter accused the arbitrators of 
improprieties in conducting the arbitration proceedings that bordered on 
criminal behavior. 
 
 84. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 3. 
 85. See Arbitration Hearing, Mar. 26, 2008, Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel at 6 [2008] 
(unpublished) (Isr.).  
 86. For instance, they met privately with hospitals’ general managers in order to hear firsthand 
their view as to the problems with the doctors’ remuneration system. On March 26, 2008, the 
arbitration board decided that it would cease this practice. See Arbitration Hearing, Mar. 26, 2008, 
Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel at 2 [2008] (unpublished) (Isr.). 
 87. Roni Linder-Ganz, The Finance Ministry Attacks the Arbitrators in the Dispute over Doctors’ 
Salary: You Have Hidden Information from Us, MARKER, Oct. 3, 2008, at 2. 
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The IMA saw this as an attempt to put pressure on the arbitrators;88 others 
believed it seeded the ground for quashing the award.89 In any case, these 
allegations, especially the last, caused all hell to break loose. It created 
acrimony between the three neutral arbitrators and the public employers’ 
counsels, which resulted in bitter exchanges during the arbitration sessions. The 
attack on the neutral arbitrators’ conduct brought the chair to adopt two 
measures. First, he ordered the arbitration board’s secretary to list and, when 
necessary, to make copies of all the documents in the arbitration files.90 Second, 
he hired the head of the leading labor and employment law firm in Israel as the 
arbitration board’s legal counsel. 
VI 
THE ARBITRATION AWARD 
The ninety-eight-page Arbitration Award contains, in fact, three separate 
awards—one written by the three neutral arbitrators and the other two written 
by each of the partisan arbitrators. These are not dissent opinions, as are 
commonly seen in arbitration, but full-text arbitration awards. They are 
standing testimony to the neutral arbitrators’ failure to fully engage the partisan 
arbitrators on the board. 
The substantive and operative part of the award is relatively short and 
simple. It covers the period through the end of the ten-year no-strike arbitration 
agreement. It provides for an across-the-board wage increase of 23.5 percent 
and for an additional sum equivalent of 0.7 percent to be paid to doctors 
employed in fields suffering from an acute shortage, that is, intensive care, 
neonatology, and anesthesiology. The total figure, 24.2 percent, was adopted 
from a settlement that had been reached in the recent dispute between the 
Senior Academic Staff Unions at the seven public universities and the 
government after a long strike. The Arbitration Award concludes that it is only 
reasonable to grant the doctors who chose not to strike the same wage increase 
that had been granted by the government91 to those who did.92 The award then 
goes on to anchor this to the decision-making criteria93 stipulated in the no-
strike arbitration agreement. 
 
 88. Id. The neutral arbitrators shared this impression. See Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 25. 
 89. Roni Linder-Ganz, The Finance Ministry Is Preparing for Loss, MARKER, Oct. 3, 2008, at 2. 
 90. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 24. 
 91. The award explains that if such a wage increase was granted by the government holding full 
power and discretion, it can be granted in situations when the power and discretion have been taken 
from the government and handed to the arbitrators. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 40. 
 92. Id. at 33, 36. 
 93. Id. at 27–30. The criteria are salary and working conditions in similar occupations, the labor 
market for doctors, special working conditions (such as pressure, responsibility, education, and 
physical-hygiene factors), the government wage policy, stability of labor relations, and cost of living. 
See supra note 61, at Appendix. 
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The most meaningful aspect of the Arbitration Award is the non-operative 
and non-binding part. The award describes at length the no-strike arbitration 
agreement, the underlying intent and assumptions of its architects, and the 
milestones in the arbitration. Finally, it provides, as obiter dictum, a set of non-
binding albeit detailed recommendations regarding a host of substantive issues 
dealt with during the arbitration. 
The approach adopted by the Arbitration Award was unexpected and 
incomprehensible. During the proceedings, the arbitration board had dealt with 
many subjects and canvassed in-depth information and insights about public 
healthcare and related issues using a wide-angle lens. It heroically rebuffed 
attempts by the state and public employers to limit subjects for arbitration in 
advance. But when it came to the finishing line, the neutral arbitrators chose the 
opposite approach and took it to the extreme. The award excludes a host of 
subjects from the substantive part, subjects that were undoubtedly under the 
board’s jurisdiction, and confined itself to two straightforward bread and butter 
issues. One probable explanation is the neutral arbitrators wished to express 
their deep frustration with the state of public healthcare, the parties’ 
negotiation culture, and the untenable position that the state and other public 
employers had put them in. The following is a brief account of the way this 
frustration is dealt with in the award. 
A.  Public Health as Equilibrium of Deformations 
Throughout the award, the arbitrators vociferate that the public health 
system has been operating for years as an “equilibrium of deformations”94 that 
is in an acute situation and urgently needs systemic change. The arbitrators 
blame public employers for being inattentive to immediate needs for reforms in 
order to cope with new challenges such as the threatening growth of non-
egalitarian private medical care, emigration of doctors, and the future shortage 
of doctors.95 They also criticize the government for its failure to overhaul the 
system following the Public Commission’s report and recommendations.96 The 
neutral arbitrators emphasized that they had undertaken to become arbitrators 
as a public mission in which they saw themselves, to some extent, following in 
the footsteps of the Public Commission.97 Their goal was to promote 
employment-related reforms in the management of doctors’ work, 
remuneration, and working conditions. Notwithstanding, the basic premise 
underlying the award is that real reforms can come only through negotiations 
and the arbitration board is devoid of ability, power, or authority to do so. 
 
 94. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 3. 
 95. Id. at 10. 
 96. Id. at 18. 
 97. Id. at 10. 
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B.  The Negotiations Culture—Getting to “No”98 
The arbitrators criticize the parties for their ongoing failure to negotiate on 
their own and their inability to agree on a single issue appearing on their 
common and separate agendas. According to the award,99 failure to address 
these issues has led to the demise of the public health system due to its inability 
to adjust to the changing environment as well as patients and doctors’ needs. 
The criticism refers to the opportunities for negotiating directly before and 
throughout the arbitration as well as to negotiating through the partisan 
arbitrators within the safe harbor100 provided for by the tripartite structure of 
the arbitration board. The arbitrators complain that whenever they urged the 
parties to negotiate, their efforts were misconstrued. Instead of seeing it as an 
opportunity to bring about a real and sustainable change through autonomous 
negotiations, the parties perceived the arbitrators’ initiative as relinquishing the 
power of decision-making and returning it to the public employers.101 
C.  The Chained Arbitrators 
The neutral arbitrators were frustrated with the parties, especially the state 
and other public employers, for constantly trying to tie the board’s hands and 
prevent it from deciding on reforms that both sides perceived as badly needed 
and long overdue.102 
As an example, the award raises the subject of private medical care 
provided after the doctors’ working day under public-hospital auspices.103 This 
could benefit the mutual interests of both public employers and doctors, and 
has been on the agenda and in stalemate for years. Nonetheless, the arbitrators 
were not allowed to address it in their decision. The award noted that all 
hospital general managers who had testified in the arbitration had urged the 
board to include as many reforms as possible in the award. In contrast, those 
who represented the public employers insisted that doing so would result in a 
loss of credibility and trust for the arbitrators and for the award.104 
The neutral arbitrators’ point of departure was that they were not allowed 
to decide on reforms or change work practices without specific authorization 
through full consent of the parties.105 To their disappointment, the public 
employers were acting against their own interests. Instead of using the 
arbitration as a platform to introduce reforms, they insisted throughout the 
 
 98. See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 1981) (this section paraphrases the title of this 
book). 
 99. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 4. 
 100. The award uses the term “sheltered home.” Id. at 4, 49. 
 101. Id. at 4. 
 102. Id. at 62–63. 
 103. Id. at 4. 
 104. Id. at 36. 
 105. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 25. 
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arbitration on a very narrow reading of the board’s authority. In the concluding 
sentence, the neutral arbitrators summarize their frustration by saying that they 
had come to office to introduce a lasting change in the system of public 
healthcare. Unfortunately, they found their hands tied.106 
VII 
EVALUATION 
This part draws heavily on the interviews with the parties and their counsels. 
The experience under the no-strike arbitration agreement is evaluated using the 
following six criteria: (1) industrial peace; (2) impact on negotiations; (3) impact 
on employment and labor relations; (4) cost and time; (5) court intervention; 
and (6) acceptability and satisfaction. These criteria are commonly used in the 
literature.107 The analysis of the findings will be discussed in the next part. 
A.  Industrial Peace 
Like elsewhere,108 the no-strike arbitration agreement’s major success was in 
avoiding strikes. Although during this period there were 280 incidences of strike 
and job actions (that is, sanctions) in the public sector and twenty incidences in 
the field of public health and welfare, there were no reported strikes or other 
job actions by doctors.109 
According to the new IMA chairman, the sweeping ban on strikes was badly 
exploited by line managers, primarily senior management and hospitals’ general 
managers, who knew that the IMA was restrained by the no-strike agreement. 
They unilaterally introduced changes in work practices, working conditions, and 
doctors’ working environments. Note that the no-strike arbitration agreement 
provided that any strike by the IMA would end the agreement to submit 
unsettled issues to arbitration. Any alleged violation of the no-strike obligation 
would suspend arbitration proceedings, and findings of breach would render the 
agreement null and void. 
 
 106. Id. at 65. 
 107. THOMAS A. KOCHAN, MORDEHAI MIRONI, RONALD G. EHRENBERG, JEAN 
BADERSCHNEIDER & TODD JICK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER FACT-FINDING AND ARBITRATION: 
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION 4–9 (1979) [hereinafter KOCHAN MIRONI]; Thomas A. Kochan, David 
B. Lipsky, Mary Newhart & Alan Benson, The Long-Haul Effects of Interest Arbitration: The Case of 
New York State’s Taylor Law, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 565, 569 (2010) [hereinafter Kochan 
Lipsky]. 
 108. Kochan Lipsky, supra note 107, at 569–70. 
 109. See generally MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY & EMPLOYMENT, THE LABOR 
RELATIONS COMMISSIONER’S REPORT ON STRIKES, available at http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/exeres/ 
59E50665-0620-47B8-9C1F-DBA9248B4972.htm. Some of the strikes, like those of the high school 
teachers and the senior academic staff, were very long. 
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B.  Compatibility with Negotiations 
The no-strike arbitration model was premised on the following assumptions: 
(1) during the ten years, there would be several rounds of negotiations; (2) in 
order to avoid the uncertainty and loss of control over the outcomes associated 
with arbitration, the parties would reach agreement on their own; (3) even if 
they failed to reach agreement, the issues left for arbitration would be marginal 
and well defined; and (4) if parties resorted frequently to arbitration, they 
would learn and adapt as a result of the experience, which would “even out” the 
outcomes. 
In reality, none of these assumptions materialized. Due to the economic 
crisis, the high turnover of arbitrators, the ongoing litigation over the scope of 
the arbitration, and the length of the arbitration proceedings, there was only 
one round of negotiations and a single arbitration experience. Furthermore, the 
availability of arbitration as a post-negotiations step created a “chilling 
effect.”110 Instead of negotiating, the parties were rushing to arbitration; and 
instead of conceding and moving during the negotiations, the parties adopted 
extreme positions111 and stuck to them in preparation for the arbitration. Finally, 
instead of “leftovers” from the negotiations (that is, marginal and well-defined 
issues), the parties brought all of the issues in dispute to arbitration.112 
C. Impact on Employment and Labor Relations 
Experience with interest arbitration113 indicates it is a conservative process. 
Arbitration boards tend to rely on comparability and stay away from reforms 
and innovations. This case is no exception. It is only exceptional in the degree 
of conservatism and the disproportion between the breadth and depth of the 
arbitration proceedings and the substantive outcome. 
After very lengthy and costly proceedings that analyzed a broad array of 
work-related issues, the arbitration board confined itself to a relatively simple 
and narrow solution. The award provides for an across-the-board wage increase 
and additional small increases to doctors practicing in fields with acute 
shortages, which may improve their ability to attract doctors. Otherwise, the 
substantive part of the award carries far less impact on employment relations 
than the agreement signed at the end of the mediation.114 The eighteen months 
since the release of the award indicate that the fears of the public employers 
regarding the threatened stability of labor relations with other unions in the 
 
 110. See Kochan Lipsky, supra note 107, at 566. 
 111. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 4. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Kochan Lipsky, supra note 107, at 583; Mordehai Mironi, Arbitration as Strike Substitute in 
Labour Negotiations—Public Policy Reconsidered, 28 ALTA. L. REV. 163, 190–91 (1980). 
 114. The agreement of 2000 attempted to address the skewed salary structure through pay 
differentials and introduce changes in pension rights in order to address the different needs of public 
employers and doctors. In addition, it tried to solve the old problem of interns working after on-duty 
shifts. 
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public sector and in public health (that is, the “domino effect”115) did not 
materialize. 
The arbitration proceedings left all the participants with bad bruises. More 
important, one of the no-strike arbitration agreement’s goals was to create a 
new and improved labor-relations regime built on cooperation, mutual trust, 
and understanding.116 In fact, as the interviews clearly demonstrate, the long 
road to arbitration and the highly combative litigation and arbitration 
proceedings intensified the rivalry, animosity, and distrust between the parties. 
The Arbitration Award left the relationship between the IMA and the public 
employers in deep crisis.117 
However, the Arbitration Award may have a broad and sustainable impact 
in the long run. A substantial part of the award was devoted to non-binding 
recommendations regarding many work-related reforms in areas inside and 
outside the arbitration board’s mandate. These recommendations are insightful 
and highly detailed, and they provide operational steps to be taken. 
Implementing the recommendations requires the mutual belief that a change is 
needed and feasible, and that it can serve the common and separate needs of 
the parties. In addition, the basic premise of the award is all substantial reforms 
must come through negotiations. It is left to be seen whether, given the present 
crisis in labor relations, the parties can marshal the high level of mutual respect 
and trust118 as well as the goodwill and cooperation needed to make it happen. 
D.  Cost and Time 
The arbitration was long—almost four years—and was very costly. 
Admittedly, a substantial part of the delay was due to the turnover of 
arbitrators and the litigation. All seemed to agree the long time span was a 
major negative factor and interest arbitration should end within a year at most. 
Throughout the four-year period, the neutral arbitrators rejected the public 
employers’ repeated attempts to confine the boundaries of the arbitration. The 
neutral arbitrators were eager to study the public health system in depth in 
order to form educated and feasible decisions about reforms. Thus, the material 
brought before the arbitrators was broad in scope and analytically rich. It 
consumed thousands of hours of preparation119 and forced the parties and the 
board to use experts and consultants, adding to the expense and intensifying the 
disproportion between the investment and the substantive outcome. 
 
 115. See State’s Position Paper at 21–22, 115–16, Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel (Apr. 18, 2007); 
Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 30–32, 82–84.  
 116. Interim Decision, May 30, 2005, LC 9/03 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 40 PDA 821 [2005] 
(Isr.). 
 117. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 67. 
 118. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 65. 
 119. FINANCE MINISTRY, WAGE AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS DIVISION, THE DOCTORS’ 
ARBITRATION – OUTCOMES AND LESSONS 3 (2010). 
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E.  Court-Administered Arbitration 
In the arbitration practice, especially commercial transnational arbitration, a 
distinction is drawn between administered and non-administered, or private, 
arbitration. Administered arbitration refers to situations where an arbitration-
provider institution other than the arbitrator manages and sometimes 
supervises the arbitration. The arbitration between the IMA and the public 
employers was meant to be non-administered, but it turned into court-
administered arbitration. The National Labor Court was heavily involved in 
promoting and monitoring the pre-arbitration negotiations, ushering the parties 
into the arbitration room, appointing arbitrators, determining arbitrators’ fees 
and cost allocation, defining the subjects that came under the jurisdiction of the 
arbitration board, and monitoring the internal dynamics between the neutral 
and the partisan arbitrators on the board. Its involvement began before 
arbitration started and it continued until the last days. During the early stages, 
the applications to the court were initiated by the IMA. By contrast, towards 
the end, the public employers did most of the initiating. 
F.  Parties’ Satisfaction 
When asked about their satisfaction with the no-strike arbitration model, 
the parties used different frameworks. The IMA looked, first and foremost, at 
the ten-year period under the sweeping ban on strikes, the lost dream regarding 
the Public Commission, and the long and exhausting road to arbitration. The 
Arbitration Award took the back seat. The public employers, in contrast, 
downplayed the fact that there were no strikes for ten years and ignored the 
Public Commission. They concentrated on the arbitration component of the 
model. 
As to the Arbitration Award, the IMA was satisfied with the salary increase 
and its success in blocking the public employers from using the arbitration to 
introduce the punch clock. Notwithstanding, because the IMA saw the 
arbitration as bringing change and hope to doctors,120 it was disappointed with 
the board’s last minute reluctance to introduce reforms. On the strategic level, 
the no-strike arbitration model was very disappointing for the IMA and for 
doctors. Instead of empowering doctors and enhancing their status, the no-
strike arbitration agreement damaged doctors’ self-image and self-esteem. 
According to the IMA leadership’s narrative, the ban on striking was 
exploited by the public employers, resulting in grudging assent or increased 
resort to litigation. Both results left doctors feeling powerless. The government 
reneged on its obligation regarding the Public Commission, which, for the IMA, 
was an important element in the model. Additionally, the public employers 
were successful in defeating the promise of arbitration. They used exogenous 
 
 120. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 66. 
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factors and manipulation to ignore their obligation to submit to arbitration121 
and to postpone, prolong, and subvert the arbitration proceedings. The 
humiliation and cynicism experienced by the doctors during the ten years led 
the IMA’s new leadership to give up on the idea of arbitration and opt for 
strikes as a means of reclaiming doctors’ dignity, power, and control. 
In the public employers’ camp, the feelings were mixed. The public 
employers were dissatisfied with the uneven-handed approach of the neutral 
arbitrators and the procedural flaws in arbitration proceedings.122 In addition, 
they protested the fact that none of the public employers’ demands were 
accepted, primarily the punch clock,123 and that the Arbitration Award 
contained recommendations, some of which were outside the submission and 
others which carried price tags that might be used by the IMA in the future.124 
The Health Ministry and the Wage and Collective Agreements Division, which 
were more attuned to the day-to-day, job-related problems, were cognizant that 
they missed a golden opportunity to introduce organizational reforms in 
doctors’ employment patterns. This was due to lack of time and attention by the 
Director of the Wage and Collective Agreements Division who, during the 
arbitration, found himself occupied simultaneously with several strikes and an 
unprecedented reform involving 180,000 teachers. This left the stage open for 
the Budget Division to take the lead. 
The Finance Ministry led by the Budget Division, which was the dominating 
voice in the public employers’ camp, seemed to be satisfied. Traditionally, it has 
opposed any reforms unless they are unilaterally initiated by the Budget 
Division. In addition, it voiced the strongest resistance to arbitration. The result 
of the arbitration relieved the Finance Ministry. First, the Finance Ministry 
welcomed the fact that the substantive award was limited to a salary increase. 
Second, at the strategic level, that the arbitration was prolonged for such a long 
period, resulting in just one round of negotiation and a single arbitration in ten 
years with no retroactive payments was a major success for those who opposed 
the idea of arbitration. It ensured that neither the doctors nor other unions 
would opt for the no-strike arbitration model in the future. 
VIII 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
It is very difficult to evaluate and analyze the no-strike arbitration model 
using one round of unsuccessful negotiations and a single incidence of 
arbitration. Recent findings from a longitudinal study of a no-strike interest-
 
 121. The IMA was frustrated by the government’s unwillingness to enter into concession bargaining 
and arbitration during the economic crisis and its preference to extend the outcome of its negotiations 
with the Histadrut through legislation. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
 122. FINANCE MINISTRY, supra note 119, at 13–14. 
 123. Roni Linder-Ganz, The Doctors’ Arbitration Is a Mistake—They Took Good Money and Used 
It Badly, MARKER, Dec. 3, 2008, at 38. 
 124. FINANCE MINISTRY, supra note 119, at 10. 
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arbitration regime125 show that as parties learn to live with arbitration, there is a 
decrease in impasse rates and in resorting to arbitration.126 
Improved pre-arbitration negotiations or a reduced “chilling effect” and 
“narcotic effect”127 are not the only expected results of repeating or extending 
the no-strike arbitration model. Other negative aspects that were present in the 
doctors’ arbitration are likely to ease over time when parties accept arbitration 
as a way of life. There will be less resorting to the court and a less-defensive 
approach to the arbitration proceedings, resulting in less-formal, shorter, and 
cheaper arbitrations, and less conservative awards. 
As this case study demonstrated, four structural and attitudinal changes are 
essential to improve the performance of the no-strike arbitration model. These 
are (1) adding mediation as a preceding step to arbitration, (2) insisting on a 
regular, rather than a neutral–skewed tripartite structure, (3) changing parties’ 
conceptualization of interest arbitration, and (4) changing public employers’ 
strategic approach to power discourse. 
A.  Mediation—The Present But Absent Procedure 
During the mediation and the post-mediation negotiations,128 the parties 
rejected the idea of building two-tier impasse procedures by adding mediation 
as a preceding step to arbitration. The parties felt it was superfluous. They were 
then at the zenith of their relationship following an eye-opening experience 
with mediation. The underlying idea was that since all parties had learned to 
appreciate the value of mediation, there was no need to require mediation as a 
contractual obligation. In retrospect, that was a grave mistake. The idea behind 
investing energy in dispute-processing planning during contract formation is 
premised on the assumption this is the best time to devise an optimal system for 
resolving ex post negotiations disputes. The instant case is more proof as to the 
power of this assumption. 
The state rejected the IMA’s suggestion129 to use mediation in order to assist 
the parties in the pre-arbitration negotiations that were stalemated. The 
National Labor Court’s proposal to attempt mediation130 was met with a similar 
response. Given that the state complained the parties had not exhausted the 
negotiations and the neutral arbitrators criticized the parties’ inability to 
negotiate, it is difficult to understand the state’s opposition to mediation. One 
 
 125. The study examines thirty years of experience with compulsory arbitration for police and 
firefighters in the state of New York. Kochan Lipsky, supra note 107, at 568. 
 126. Id. at 569. 
 127. The term is used to measure the rate of parties’ dependence on arbitration in lieu of reaching 
agreement through pre-arbitration negotiations. 
 128. MEDIATION AND STRATEGIC CHANGE, supra note 14, at 85. 
 129. Arbitration Hearing, July 12, 2007, Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel at 40, 47 [2007] 
(unpublished) (Isr.). 
 130. Interim Decision, May 30, 2005, LC 9/03 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 40 PDA 821 [2005] 
(Isr.). 
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possible explanation131 is that the Finance Ministry’s leadership obsessively 
feared any encroachment on their decision-making power and felt threatened 
by any type of third-party intervention. More specifically, they resisted 
mediation since they still failed to distinguish mediation from arbitration.132 
Needless to say, the state’s position ignores that voluntarism is one of the 
basic tenets of mediation and that the only common property of arbitration and 
mediation is the involvement of a third party. Furthermore, given that the state 
desired to avoid arbitration altogether or, at most, submit to arbitration only 
minor unresolved issues or well-defined subjects that had been previously 
discussed and refined through negotiations, its refusal to try mediation resulted 
in severe damage.133 In fact, without resorting to mediation, the public 
employers accomplished none of their goals. Had they attended to studies 
showing that pre-arbitration mediation could resolve seventy to eighty percent 
of impasses,134 the results would likely have been very different. 
B.  The Tripartite Structure 
The tripartite structure is assumed to function as a complementary process 
for parties’ direct negotiations, extending the negotiations into the arbitration 
stage. The structure is assumed to create an arena for intimate summit 
negotiations between partisan arbitrators who are actually leaders of the 
parties, assisted by the neutral arbitrator acting as a special mediator with a 
club, holding a reserve power of decision. Research findings135 have shown that a 
key factor in the success and acceptability of interest arbitration is the tripartite 
structure of the arbitration board. It serves several functions, among them, to 
protect the parties and the arbitration process from ill-advised decisions, to 
improve the feasibility and practicality of the award, and to assist in “selling” 
the award to parties’ constituencies. Far more important is the tripartite 
arbitration model’s contribution to enhancing the acceptability of and 
commitment to the process. The summit negotiations among members of the 
arbitration board and the mediation by the neutral chairman136 serve as a vehicle 
for parties’ direct participation in the decision-making process and their control 
over it. This is probably the reason why post-hearing arbitration sessions are 
 
 131. This explanation was repeated during the interviews. 
 132. ALON, supra note 10, at 138–39; MEDIATION AND STRATEGIC CHANGE, supra note 14, at 86. 
Such a statement was voiced again during the interviews. 
 133. This conclusion is supported by the parties’ descriptions of the futile pre-arbitration 
negotiations. See State’s Position Paper, supra note 115, at 69. 
 134. Kochan Lipsky, supra note 107, at 571. 
 135. See Mordehai Mironi, The Functional Approach to Judicial Oversight of Specialized 
Tribunals—A Case Study, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 745, 787–91 (1977) (discussing the unique value and 
contribution of the tripartite structure of the arbitration board). See also KOCHAN MIRONI, supra note 
107, at 96–105; Kochan Lipsky, supra note 107, at 580. 
 136. These summit mediation sessions frequently produce a settlement resulting in a unanimous 
award. In other cases, the tripartite board reaches a tacit agreement but due to political constraints the 
award emerges as a majority decision accompanied by a dissent. See Kochan Lipsky, supra note 107, at 
580. 
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named “executive sessions,” rather than arbitration-board deliberations, and 
why there is universal preference among arbitrators for such a design.137 
As this case study has demonstrated, the tripartite structure of the 
arbitration board did not produce the expected dynamics and results. 
Notwithstanding, it is submitted that contrary to the Arbitration Award’s 
reckoning/assertion, the underlying assumptions of the tripartite design are far 
from naïve138 and that a tripartite structure is an inherently superior model for 
arbitrating interest disputes. The structure did not perform in the instant case 
for two interrelated reasons: (1) the misconceptions and misperceptions as to 
the partisan arbitrators’ role, and (2) the neutral–skewed nature of the 
arbitration board. 
Probably due to lack of expertise in interest arbitration and the workings of 
a tripartite board, the parties, neutral arbitrators, and court misunderstood the 
unique value and role of the partisan arbitrators. At first glance, the Arbitration 
Award’s rhetoric appeared to embrace the idea of partisan arbitrators. It 
emphasized that this was an exceptional structure in which the partisan 
arbitrators could serve as arbitrators, on the one hand, and cooperate with the 
parties and actually assume leadership positions outside and inside the 
arbitration room, on the other. 
Nonetheless, the actual language of the award attests that the neutral 
arbitrators experienced difficulties in digesting the new paradigm. The award 
tries to force this new paradigm on the traditional arbitration model and falls 
into the same trap as the courts. The neutral arbitrators complain that the 
disengagement of the partisan arbitrators from the disputants, called for by 
their position as arbitrators, did not materialize. The only comfort they find is in 
the fact that the partisan arbitrators’ freedom to travel between the party’s 
chambers and the board’s podium was open, transparent, and with the 
knowledge of the neutral arbitrators and the parties.139 In conclusion, the 
arbitrators use the bad experience in the instant case as proof of the tripartite 
design’s naiveté. According to the award, instead of improving the quality and 
dynamic of the negotiations leading to resolution by consent, the tripartite 
structure pushed the parties apart. 
The conclusion reflects yet another misunderstanding shared by the neutral 
arbitrators and the state’s counsel regarding the true value of the tripartite 
design. They failed to distinguish among the four possible negotiation 
configurations: (1) pre-arbitration direct negotiations between the parties;140 (2) 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. The award wrongly claims that the tripartite structure is naïve. See Arbitration Award, supra 
note 26, at 3. 
 139. Id. 
 140. The state’s counsel appeared to be the strongest supporter of the tripartite structure. He 
believed that the partisan arbitrators were supposed to soften the adversarial nature of the parties’ 
discourse. State’s Position Paper, supra note 115, at 45. 
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parties’ direct negotiations during arbitration;141 (3) parties’ assisted negotiations 
during arbitration using the neutral arbitrators as mediators;142 and (4) assisted 
post-hearing summit negotiations between partisan arbitrators, during 
executive sessions, using the neutral arbitrators as mediators. 
A tripartite arbitration board may indeed encourage the parties to negotiate 
or offer its services as a mediator. Nonetheless, as stated, the tripartite design’s 
unique value has been in the fourth configuration, that is, assisted post-hearing 
summit negotiations between partisan arbitrators. The best way to maximize 
this value is by using a straight tripartite, not a neutral–skewed, arbitration 
board. 
When the option of contract-renewal arbitration was discussed during 
mediation, the public employers searched for ways to protect themselves from 
ill-advised and highly problematic awards.143 The measure finally selected 
provided for an optional neutral–skewed tripartite composition of the 
arbitration board. According to the interviews, the public employers’ 
assumption was that such a board would act more responsibly and with greater 
accountability than a tripartite board with a single neutral chairman. In 
retrospect, proposing this option was a grave mistake. 
As expected, the parties opted for a neutral–skewed board, which probably 
enhanced the public employers’ confidence. At the same time, the neutral–
skewed composition destroyed the unique value of the tripartite design for 
interest arbitration. The arbitration board did not conduct post-hearing 
“executive sessions” devoted to summit negotiations among the members of the 
arbitration board and to mediation by the neutral chairman. Instead, the neutral 
arbitrators engaged in deliberations in which the partisan arbitrators were 
invited to provide information and consultation. The neutral–skewed tripartite 
board was arguably the single most important structural flaw; it should be 
avoided at all cost in the future. 
C.  The Essence of Interest Arbitration 
The Arbitration Award suggests two explanations for the narrow approach 
adopted in the substantive part of the award. First, labor contract-renewal 
arbitration is an economic (interest) dispute. Hence, the arbitrators are not 
allowed to unilaterally decide on reforms or to change work practices without 
specific authorization bestowed upon them through parties’ full consent.144 
Second, decisions in interest arbitration, including decisions relating to wage 
increases, are by definition inferior in terms of clarity and ability to implement145 
to decisions arrived by parties’ mutual consent. According to the Arbitration 
 
 141. Id.; See also Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 4. 
 142. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 49. 
 143. One suggestion was to give the Prime Minister veto power in case an award endangered the 
economy. See MEDIATION AND STRATEGIC CHANGE, supra note 14, at 41–42. 
 144. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 25. 
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Award, a unilateral arbitration decision is a less suitable medium for dealing 
with evidentiary, substantive, and technical issues146 associated with salary and 
working conditions. Consequently, in comparison, an agreement arrived at 
through bilateral negotiations stands a better chance of being implemented, in 
all aspects, than a unilateral arbitration award. 
The basic premise that decisions arrived at by parties’ mutual consent are 
always preferable to those imposed by third-party decree is beyond dispute. 
However, the two explanations given by the arbitration board for the extremely 
narrow reading of its authority reflect an incorrect conceptualization of interest 
arbitration. Characterizing an interest arbitration award as a unilateral decision 
is conceptually wrong in general, and under a tripartite-arbitration-board 
model, in particular. In addition, it is unwarranted. The first explanation runs 
against basic tenets of arbitration law and practice; the second relies on an 
incorrect depiction of labor negotiations. 
An interest arbitration award, especially one produced by a tripartite board, 
is not a unilateral decision in the general sense and certainly not as the term is 
used in industrial and labor relations.147 The parties by mutual consent select the 
arbitration board and empower it to make a final and binding decision if they 
fail to reach agreement on their own. The tripartite arbitration board is an 
agent or proxy of both parties. It is asked by them jointly to draft a single 
document establishing a new set of rights and duties to govern their 
relationship, through a process that allows them direct participation. Quite 
often, the arbitration award is submitted for registration or is deemed by law to 
be a bilateral collective agreement.148 
The notion that arbitrators are not allowed to decide on a subject in dispute 
without specific authorization provided for through parties’ full consent is also 
unwarranted. True, case law on arbitration in Israel has adopted a peculiar 
approach toward the arbitrator’s authority to decide whether a particular 
subject comes under the submission or jurisdiction of the arbitrator. When the 
duty to arbitrate is not in dispute, arbitration law in the United Kingdom149 and 
in the United States,150 including labor arbitration,151 grants the arbitrator power 
to determine what issues fall within the scope of the arbitration. In Israel, in 
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BARCELÓ & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 134, 140, 207 (4th ed. 2009). 
 151. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1416–23 (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgins, Jr. eds., 5th 
ed. 2006). 
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contrast, this question is left for the court to decide unless a special 
authorization is granted to the arbitrator either by agreement or statute.152 The 
arbitration board overlooked the fact that the Settlement of Labor Disputes 
Law of 1957 provides for such authorization.153 If the general rule was 
insufficient, the National Labor Court proclaimed it loud and clear. Referring 
to the instant case, it said in cases of dispute, the arbitration board has the 
authority to exercise its own discretion in deciding which subjects come under 
its jurisdiction, as is commonly done in arbitration.154 
The idea that parties’ consent is always superior to a third-party decision is a 
normative principle that runs through the literature on ADR155 and in labor-
dispute settlements.156 The criticism is against the Arbitration Award’s assertion 
that an agreement arrived at through labor negotiations is always clearer and 
easier to implement than an arbitration award. The reason given is that 
negotiators are in a better position to foresee and deal with the 
interrelationships and ramifications of the issues under consideration.157 This 
explanation is unsupported, in general, and highly inappropriate in this 
particular case. 
Agreements arrived at through collective bargaining, especially under threat 
of strike or during a strike,158 are rarely clear, complete, and easy to 
implement.159 This is why the agreement is constantly supplemented and 
rewritten through the contract administration,160 and through institutions such as 
the grievance procedure161 and the bipartite follow-up committee.162 Quite often, 
decision-makers in interest arbitration may have less pressure, more time, and 
greater resources than their counterparts who act under a threat or during 
strike. As a result, the former are more likely to come up with a much clearer, 
 
 152. See OTTOLENGHI, supra note 66, at 583–85. 
 153. Settlement of Labour Disputes Law, 1957–5717, 11 LSI 51, 54 (1957) (Isr.). 
 154. See Interim Decision, Aug. 7, 2005, LC 9/03 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 40 PDA 821 
[2005] (Isr.). 
 155. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Towards Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of 
Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 454, 457 (1984); KENNETH CLOKE, MEDIATING DANGEROUSLY: 
THE FRONTIERS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 169–70 (2001); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY 
CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE 21–33 (1987). 
 156. Jonathan Harkavi, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation in Resolving Sexual 
Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 157 (1999); KOCHAN MIRONI, supra note 107, at 
5–6. 
 157. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 33–34. 
 158. JULIUS G. GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC 
PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE 162 (1988). 
 159. ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 541 (1976); Archibald Cox, Reflections 
upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1493, 1498–99 (1959). 
 160. DANIEL QUINN MILLS, LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 562–63 (5th ed. 1994). 
 161. LAURA J. COOPER, DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 16–
18 (2000); GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 158, at 161–68; ARCHIBALD COX, DEREK CURTIS BOK 
& ROBERT A. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 714–16 (13th ed. 2001). 
 162. Such procedure for implementation is provided for in the no-strike arbitration agreement and 
in the award. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 48. 
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thoughtful, and easy to implement decision. In addition, the partisan arbitrators 
are there in order to make sure all interrelationships and ramifications are 
fleshed out and addressed. This was especially true in the instant case. No 
negotiations could match the time and resources invested by the arbitrators and 
the parties in discussing and analyzing the issues. Furthermore, in terms of 
clarity, thoughtfulness, and readiness for implementation, the detailed and 
insightful recommendations contained in the award were second to none. 
The story of the four integrative issues that had been left open for 
continuous negotiations in the 1994 agreement163 and have been left unresolved 
in the arbitration is an illuminating example. The problem of the public 
employers and the IMA does not lie in analyzing interrelationships and 
ramifications, but rather in “deciding,” that is, in negotiating to conclusion. 
Interest arbitration conducted by a tripartite arbitration board is the only 
known cure for this kind of problem. 
D.  Power-Based Versus Reason-Based Discourse 
Studies indicate that employers’ negative attitudes towards compulsory 
arbitration explain the relatively low level of acceptability assigned by public-
sector employers to the arbitrators, the arbitration process, and the outcomes.164 
Employers who are ideologically opposed to arbitration tend to circumvent and 
prolong the arbitration and are more likely to resort to courts during the 
arbitration proceedings, and ex-post, in order to quash the award.165 
It was the Prime Minister’s decision to adopt the no-strike arbitration model 
at the end of the mediation. With the exception of the Director of the Wage and 
Collective Agreements Division and his legal counsel, all those in power 
positions with the state and other public employers, particularly the Finance 
Minister and the Budget Division at the Finance Ministry, were vehemently 
against this. In their narrative, the no-strike agreement was akin to compulsory 
rather than to voluntary arbitration. Their opposition only strengthened over 
time.166 They resisted the very idea of relinquishing public employers’ power to 
make decisions as to labor cost167 and to replace the power-based discourse with 
reason- or equity-based discourse.168 With the Prime Minister out of office and 
the two senior supporters of arbitration leaving the Finance Ministry, the 
arbitration ship left shore stripped of public employer commitment and support. 
 
 163. The four integrative issues were rotation of department heads and heads of units, 
organizational reforms of emergency rooms, organizational restructuring of hospitals by creating 
divisions, and continuing education. 
 164. KOCHAN MIRONI, supra note 107, at 146–52. 
 165. See, e.g., Mironi, The Functional Approach, supra note 135, at 163 (chronicling the case of the 
Nassau County police arbitration). 
 166. ALON, supra note 10, at 170. 
 167. State’s Position Paper, supra note 115, at 35. 
 168. ALON, supra note 10, at 177. 
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In the interviews, public employers’ representatives declared that even 
though they had bitterly fought against the idea during the mediation, 
nonetheless, once the no-strike agreement was signed, they truly accepted the 
model. They were willing to give the arbitration a fair chance, provided it was 
conducted properly. 
These declarations were incongruent with the ideological opposition of 
those who were actually leading the public employers’ side169 throughout the 
arbitration; nor were these declarations supported by the public employers’ 
statements170 or overt behavior throughout the arbitration.171 This attitude was 
not only a source of frustration for the IMA, the courts, and the neutral 
arbitrators. It is probably the single most important behavioral variable 
explaining why the IMA and other unions do not see arbitration as an 
acceptable dispute-resolution procedure and why the doctors’ arbitration was 
labeled “handicapped arbitration.” 
Without attitudinal change, every experiment with interest arbitration is 
doomed to fail. There are two possible roads to deal with public employers’ 
ideological opposition to using interest arbitration as a strike substitute, 
including in essential services: challenge its underlying reasoning and offer a 
new paradigm. 
The opposition to interest arbitration rests on two grounds: (1) resistance to 
relinquishing power to make public-spending decisions to non-governmental, 
non-accountable private individuals; and (2) preference for power-based 
discourse over reason- and equity-based discourse. What it boils down to is the 
Finance Ministry’s desire to retain the ultimate power and control. 
The accountability argument is in fact a fig leaf. No Finance Minister or 
senior officer has ever been held accountable for ill-advised or disastrous 
concessions in labor negotiations.172 Furthermore, repeated studies have shown 
no significant differences between negotiated and arbitrated outcomes.173 
 
 169. The first arbitration session took place after the two senior officers in the Finance Ministry who 
had supported the idea of arbitration left office. The long period taken by the government to appoint a 
new Director of Wage and Collective Agreements Division and the fact that he brought to office 
neither a background in public-sector labor relations nor experience, enabled the Budget Division to 
assume a leadership position and to dictate the state’s and other public employers’ approach towards 
the arbitration. 
 170. See Interim Decision, May 30, 2005, LC 9/03 Israel Med Ass’n v. State of Israel at 5 [2005] 40 
PDA 821 (Isr.). 
 171. The courts, the arbitrators, and the IMA leadership all felt that the state and public employers 
were using various means to postpone, prolong, and obstruct the arbitration; to make it insignificant 
and meaningless; and to lay down an infrastructure for quashing the arbitration award. See Arbitration 
Award, supra note 26, at 66; Interim Decision, Aug. 7, 2005, LC 9/03 Israel Med. Ass’n v. State of Israel 
at 3 [2005] (unpublished) (Isr.); Interim Decision, Aug. 25, 2005, LC 9/03 Israel  Med. Ass’n v. State of 
Israel at 2 [2005] (unpublished) (Isr.); Interim Decision, June 5, 2008, LC 12/08 Israel  Med. Ass’n v. 
State of Israel at 2–3 [2008] (unpublished) (Isr.); Arbitration Session, July, 10, 2008, Israel Med. Ass’n 
v. State of Israel at 14 [2008] (unpublished) (Isr.); ALON, supra note 10, at 258, 264. 
 172. For instance, this includes the sixty-percent salary increase granted to the IMA in 1994. The 
Finance Minister had been highly criticized for the 1994 deal, which many claimed had dismantled the 
government’s restrictive wage policy and swept the entire public sector into an unnecessary wave of 
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The argument regarding the superiority of power discourse and the 
importance of retaining control is not likely to withstand the pressure of a 
painful strike in essential services. Past experience has indicated that under such 
circumstances, power-based discourse may lead to concessions that exceed 
those that could have been decided through arbitration using reason- and 
equity-based discourse. Furthermore, during strikes in essential services, the 
Finance Ministry may not retain power and control anyway since it will be 
taken away by the Prime Minister.174 
In conclusion, from the Finance Ministry’s standpoint and as far as essential 
services are concerned, interest arbitration is preferable to a power struggle. It 
may produce as good or better substantive outcomes and is a much better 
safeguard against the possibility of losing power and control. 
Another and more promising road to overcoming public employers’ 
opposition is offering a new way to reframe the strategic approach towards 
interest arbitration. The reframing is three-pronged and consists of the 
following: First, conceptualize interest arbitration by a tripartite arbitration 
board as a third step in a multi-step dialogue or negotiations. The first step in 
the dialogue is direct negotiations; the second step is mediated negotiations, and 
the third, mediated summit negotiations. Being a form of negotiations or 
dialogue, interest arbitration may not entail relinquishing decision-making 
power. Next, recognize that strategic, interest-based negotiations are more 
efficient and may produce better and more sustainable outcomes than power 
discourse. Finally, accept that multi-step negotiations are the best road to 
transforming adversarial, positional, and power-based negotiations into 
strategic and interest-based negotiations. 
IX 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
It is safe to conclude both parties have no strong desire to extend the period 
of the no-strike arbitration agreement, which created a sheltered, non-violent, 
and strike-free environment for the public, for the doctors, and for the 
employers. The interviews establish that both parties are opting for non-
 
salary increases. Nonetheless, he neither resigned nor was removed from office. In fact, he was 
reappointed. 
 173. Kochan Lipsky, supra note 107, at 571–79. Another longitudinal study of police wages reported 
that neither the presence of arbitration nor the use of arbitration had led to escalation of wages beyond 
the wage level negotiated in other states without arbitration. See Orley Ashenfelter & Dean Hyslop, 
Measuring the Effect of Arbitration on Wage Levels: The Case of Police Officers, 54 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 316, 316–28 (2001). 
 174. In two recent instances, that is, the high school teachers’ strike and the senior academic staff 
strike, the Finance Ministry, which has traditionally been against arbitration, cynically suggested 
submitting the dispute to arbitration. This was simply a means of resuming power and control. It had 
discovered that the Prime Minister was about to intervene in a strike and to close a deal with the 
relevant minister over the Finance Ministry’s head. Relying on the experience of the doctors 
“handicapped arbitration,” the two unions refused. 
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renewal for similar reasons—loss of power and control. On the basis of this 
study, it appears that the state and the public employers did not give the no-
strike arbitration model a fair chance. It is a pity to see that both parties are 
unwilling to give the experiment another chance. They chose to base their final 
judgment on a single round of negotiations and one arbitration proceeding that 
began and was conducted under unusual and negative exogenous events. 
The decision not to extend the no-strike arbitration agreement is especially 
disappointing not only because it was the most innovative experiment in Israel’s 
labor relations, but also because of the particular context—doctors in public 
healthcare. In view of the special context, arbitration is the only viable strike 
substitute. Going back to power-based discourse and using strikes as the arbiter 
is problematic for the doctors as well as for the government. If the parties are 
still debating their policies, here are some thoughts they should revisit. 
The disputes between the IMA and the government have never been only 
about money. They have been about voice, the future status of public 
healthcare, and the doctors’ professional quality of life. Strikes, especially 
escalated strikes, are unlikely to provide a real voice or improve the status of 
public healthcare or the status of doctors. Moreover, the right to strike needs to 
be reframed in the context of the doctors’ moral obligations towards their 
patients. 
Doctors are not typical employees, nor are they typical essential employees. 
Doctors’ intimate contact with their patients and the immense power and 
control they have over patients’ lives and well-being put the doctors in an 
unusual position. They will often find it difficult to give up power and control; 
in this case, the control over the decision whether and when to use the power of 
strike. At the same time, these special relationships constrain their ability to 
actually exercise their right to strike. Considering these inhibitions, the doctors 
face unique constraints in using strikes or the threat of strikes to exert pressure 
in contract negotiations. 
The no-strike arbitration model gives the doctors a voice and relieves them 
of the difficult moral dilemma of whether to strike. It takes away the power to 
strike without leaving them voiceless and powerless; depending on the whim of 
public employers. The state and other public employers relinquish their 
decision-making power and entrust neutral arbitrators who are not public 
officials with the authority to make binding decisions regarding doctors’ salaries 
and working conditions. That doctors are the only group of professional 
employees whose labor relations operate under this model may not only shield 
their achievement from claims based on parity, but it also can enhance the 
doctors’ status. 
The government’s inclination not to extend the no-strike arbitration 
agreement is not only wrong on normative or moral grounds; it is also 
functionally inconceivable. For the government not to make serious efforts to 
eliminate doctors’ strikes is also a form of violence, albeit passive, permitting 
interference in the medical well-being of the citizenry. The Arbitration Award 
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concluded that public healthcare had not been able to respond to the changing 
environment; further, it noted that strategic and systemic reforms were long 
overdue. The Finance Ministry has traditionally refused to recognize the IMA 
as a legitimate partner for negotiating strategic and systemic changes in the 
public healthcare system or in the allocation of public resources to it. 
Nonetheless, the only way out of stagnation is by giving the IMA a voice. 
There is the duty of information and consultation on non-mandatory subjects 
for bargaining as well as the duty to negotiate on impact.175 In addition, many of 
the badly needed organizational changes are job-related and could not be 
introduced without IMA’s consent and cooperation. Consequently, in addition 
to securing industrial peace, an arbitration award might bring about gains for 
the employers, gains which they had been unable to achieve through regular 
negotiations.176 
Finally, at the public-policy level, the government took a historic step in 
2000 by assuming leadership in experimenting with a model of non-violent, 
consensual conflict resolution in healthcare. It should not discard it so easily. 
Clinging wholeheartedly to the no-strike arbitration model and giving it a better 
chance will reflect governmental commitment to change in the power-based, 
labor-relations dispute-resolution culture. 
Last but not least is the incomprehensible refusal of the state and public 
employers to accept repeated offers to use mediation. As the experience with 
mediation in 2000 demonstrated, the IMA and the public employers were 
unable to reach settlement on their own during two years of direct negotiations 
and ten weeks of strike. The shift to assisted negotiations changed it all. 
Mediation was extremely effective in transforming the discourse and assisting 
them in reaching an unusually efficient and interest-based agreement. 
The negative experience with pre-arbitration negotiations in the instant 
case, the abortive attempts to negotiate throughout the arbitration, and the 
recorded success of mediation elsewhere177 reinforced the conclusion that 
mediation was badly needed. The state and other public employers’ refusal to 
use mediation was contrary to their interest. As can be discerned from the 
state’s petitions to the arbitration board and the courts, the failure to make 
some progress through negotiations harmed the public employers’ interests in 
the post-negotiations arbitration. Furthermore, provided that public employers’ 
reluctance to commit to the arbitration process was partially based on risk 
aversion, mediation is the only means for risk reduction or avoidance when 
parties reach impasse in negotiations. It is rather unfortunate that ten years 
after the doctors’ mediation, and with all the progress mediation and ADR have 
made in Israel, the Finance Ministry leadership is still hostile to mediation and 
 
 175. LA 1013/04 Discount Bank Ltd. v. Histadrut [2004] (unpublished) (Isr.); LA 400005/98 
Histadrut v. State of Israel 35 PDA 103, 120 [2000] (Isr.). 
 176. This is especially true now since future arbitration boards will be able to use the Public 
Commission and Arbitration Award’s well-thought-out and detailed analysis and recommendation. 
 177. See supra text accompanying note 134. 
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confuses it with arbitration. Clearly, much educational work still needs to be 
done. 
X 
EPILOGUE 
How can one judge the experiment in terms of it being a peaceful out-of-
court resolution? In one sense, it was peaceful. There was no escalation in the 
strike throughout the mediation and not one incidence of strike or job action 
during the period of ten years following the no-strike arbitration agreement. As 
such, the agreement contributed to the health and welfare of the public and to 
the stability of labor relations in the public sector and the public healthcare 
system.178 
If peacefulness refers to the relationship between and among the parties, 
there were two distinct periods. The level of peacefulness was relatively high 
during the mediation phase and the level of cooperation, openness, and trust 
grew over time as the mediation progressed. It reached its climax during the ex-
post negotiations over the arbitration model. 
The opposite is true regarding the ten years under the no-strike arbitration 
agreement. Instead of peacefulness, this period has been characterized by a high 
level of animosity, frustration, and distrust, which grew during the arbitration 
stage and even produced acrimony in the relationships with the neutral 
arbitrators. 
“Out of court” is seemingly an irrelevant criterion for the system under 
investigation, for these disputes were not legal or rights-based disputes but 
rather interest and non-justiciable disputes. Nonetheless, because the 
arbitration stage was far from peaceful, the parties found themselves frequently 
in the National Labor Court, which gave no less than eight decisions and 
additional interim decisions. The court had to usher and, at times, force the 
public employers into the arbitration hall and it undertook an active role in the 
administration of the arbitration until the very last minute. 
This story that started as a celebration and salute to ADR and mediation in 
healthcare is devoid of a happy ending. It is safe to conclude that both parties 
have no desire to extend the period of the no-strike arbitration agreement. 
Consequently, unless something unexpected happens, the no-strike arbitration 
model that was praised by the court and others as being innovative,179 
pioneering, unique,180 and unprecedented,181 as well as being a promising strike 
 
 178. Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 35. 
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 180. Id. at 9. 
 181. Id. at 15; Arbitration Award, supra note 26, at 66. 
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replacement for essential employees,182 a new model of labor relations,183 and a 
breakthrough in Israeli labor relations184—but was not given a fair chance to 
prove itself—will now rest in peace. 
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